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 Special Issue - Introduction 
David J. Gunkel & Joanna Bryson, Editors 
 
Moral philosophy, although historically defined in different ways by different 
intellectual traditions, is essentially about intersubjectivity. It concerns how a subject 
responds to and takes responsibility for their thinking and acting in the face of another—
an other who is, in one way or another, recognized as subject to the same moral 
consideration as the actor. Consequently, moral philosophy concerns–whether it is ever 
explicitly recognized or not–who (or what) gets to be considered a subject of moral 
consideration, a moral subject.  Moral subjectivity has two recognized aspects: moral 
agency, the capacity to be responsible for moral actions; and moral patiency, the 
property of being the recipient of moral obligations. This special issue of Philosophy and 
Technology is one of the first coordinated efforts to consider explicitly both sides of the 
moral relationship in situations involving artificially intelligent artifacts and machines.  
When it comes to deciding these fundamental questions of moral standing, we 
typically distinguish who is a moral subject from what is not. And here the two small and 
seemingly insignificant words of “who” and “what” make, as Jacques Derrida (2005, 80) 
points out, all the difference. Unfortunately, the distinction between who is a moral 
subject and what remains a mere object has never been completely resolved. In fact, 
the history of moral philosophy can be interpreted as a progressive unfolding whereby 
what had been a mere object, something we do not need to care about in moral terms, 
comes to be considered another moral subject. “When god-like Odysseus returned from 
the wars in Troy,” Aldo Leopold (1966, 237) reminds us, “he hanged all on one rope a 
dozen slave-girls of his household whom he suspected of misbehavior during his 
absence. This hanging involved no question of propriety. The girls were property. The 
disposal of property was then, as now, a matter of expediency, not of right and wrong.” 
During the time of Odysseus (at least as interpreted by Leopold), it was only the male 
head of the household who had been considered a proper moral subject, everything 
else, his women, his children, his slaves, were property under his possession, 
ostensibly objects that could be used, abused, and disposed of as he saw fit–at least 
with respect to the legal conventions of that period. Since that time, these previously 
excluded others—whether slaves, women, foreigners, or children—have been admitted 
(and often only after considerable struggles and resistance) into the gated-community of 
moral subjects, becoming other “persons” who count, or are at least deserving of some 
modicum of protection or respect.  
Recently, formal philosophical consideration has been given to extending moral 
consideration to non-human animals (Singer 1975; Regan 1993) and even the 
environment (Stone 1974; Birch, 1993), which normally comprise the excluded other of 
what can be called “the anthropocentric tradition” in ethics. Even in the biological 
sciences, referring to an animal by name or the use of gendered pronouns (“he” or 
“she”) or even the generic “who,” is considered a political act, which is excluded, on 
principle, by many scientific journals (ref.), and more recently included, in some areas of 
research, at least in the case of non-human primates. Yet while the formal literature 
often gets bogged down in questions of about the level of consciousness, sentience, or 
awareness that would be necessary for moral standing, ordinary language and daily 
behavior indicates that not only the environment but many mundane objects, such as 
paintings, laws, or cars (Floridi 2008), may deserve status beyond mere possessions of 
their owners or creators.  
Currently we stand on the verge of a potentially revolutionary challenge to many 
of the standard practices in moral philosophy. We find ourselves faced with another set 
of entities that have routinely (though not exclusively) been considered nothing more 
than objects—not someone to care about, but something to be possessed, used, and 
disposed of like Odysseus’s slave girls or the animals of multinational agri-business. 
This other form of otherness is the machine—interactive and learning algorithms that, 
once programmed and installed, make decisions with little or no human oversight; 
autonomous robots deployed as weapons on the battlefield, rescuers in disasters, 
caregivers and assistants in the home or hospital; and the intelligent systems now 
incorporated into what had previously been mere technological conveniences, like the 
instruments of transportation, communication, and media. If moral philosophy in the final 
decades of the twentieth century was defined by the animal question, it is entirely 
possible that in the early decades of the twenty-first it will be characterized by the 
machine question. 
Although there have been previous efforts to grapple with this problem, we 
recognized a need to examine more thoroughly the costs, benefits, reasons and 
rationales for considering any form of technical entity to be any type of moral subject. In 
response, we (along with our colleague Steve Torrance) hosted a dedicated symposium 
of the AISB/IACAP 2012 World Congress, which was convened in conjunction with the 
centenary celebration of the birth of Alan Turing. The timing and the venue of this event 
were deliberate. On the one hand, this joint meeting brought together an inter-
disciplinary group of scholars and researchers: philosophers, behavioral scientists, 
engineers, computer scientists, social scientists, and legal scholars, etc. This was, in 
our opinion, crucial insofar as the question of the moral position and status of the 
machine is not something limited to one discipline, method of investigation, or 
intellectual tradition. Second, Turing’s pioneering work, even if he did not express it 
exactly the terms we had utilized, was the point of origin for our inquiry and what initially 
launched our efforts. To put it in rather schematic terms, if one is not, following the 
stipulations of Turing’s “game of imitation” (1951) able to distinguish between another 
human being and a machine in interactive conversations, what would be our 
responsibility to this other? In other words, what would happen to our understanding 
and practice of ethics, if it were possible that the other in social relationships were 
otherwise than human? 
This special issue of Philosophy and Technology is made-up of papers from that 
meeting, competitively selected by the journal’s peer-review process. The eight articles 
presented here cover a wide range of issues that became evident during the course of 
the symposium. But they are all, in one way or another, an attempt to deal with what we 
perceive as the two main components of the machine question—moral agency and 
moral patiency. Questions of moral agency, as Luciano Floridi (2010) points out, involve 
situations where the machine can be defined as the originator of actions having moral 
consequences. But deciding whether and to what extent a machine might be considered 
an agent in this way is an issue that is open to considerable debate, and the articles by 
Steve Torrence, Johnny Hartz Søraker, David Davenport, and Marc Champaign explore 
the various aspects of this issue. Questions of moral patiency, by contrast, involve 
deciding whether and to what extent machines might be understood as “receivers of 
moral action” (Floridi and Sanders, 2004) and thereby an entity who possesses what 
are often called “rights” requiring respect. Again this question is highly contested and 
the contributions from John Basel, Erica L Neely, Mark Coeckelbergh, and David J. 
Gunkel pursue its various aspects and complications. 
While a single journal issue will not finally resolve the machine question, our goal 
has been to at least open the door to the question, providing an ontology of moral 
discourse and charting its range of perspectives and consequences. We therefore 
advance the modest but nevertheless important objective described by G. E Moore at 
the beginning of his Principia Ethica. “It appears to me,” Moore (2005/1903 xvii) writes, 
“that in Ethics, as in all other philosophical studies, the difficulties and disagreements, of 
which its history is full, are mainly due to a very simple cause: namely to the attempt to 
answer questions, without first discovering precisely what question it is which you desire 
to answer.” This special issue is offered as one effort to begin to discover the questions 
that we believe will define the opportunities and challenges of moral thinking in the 
coming decades. 
